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I. SHIPS
A ship is the most living of inani-
mate things.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes'
I introduce personal identity with ships for several reasons. I like
ships. Holmes wrote of ships as persons in The Common Law (though sel-
dom in his opinions: read Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen).2 Ships are legal
persons. Various inanimate things-trees and railroad engines-were subject
to forfeiture as deodands; 3 ships alone could commit torts and enter con-
tracts. The initial puzzle of identity, in modem philosophy anyway, in-
volves a ship: the ship of Theseus. And nautical fact meets and surpasses
the philosophical maritime imagination.
a. Start with the ship of Theseus: Theseus was a (legendary) king of
t Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, Tua COMMON LAW 25 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881).
2. 244 U.S. 205,218 (1917) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
3. See Bennis v. Michigan, 1995 WL712350 (U.S. Oral Arg.); infra p. 121.
4. See NORMAN DAVIES, EuRoPE: A HisToRY 91 (1996).
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Athens He killed Procrustes He escaped a plot by Medea, his
mother-in-law, to poison him.' Minos, the king of Crete, received annually
as tribute from the Athenians seven youths and seven maidens to feed the
Minotaur.' A result of improbable mating, like ligers or tigrons,9 the Min-
otaur was half man and half bull, confined in a labyrinth. A ringer if ever
there was one, Theseus disguised himself as one of the youths, killed the
Minotaur, and escaped the labyrinth guided by the thread Ariadne.10
Theseus deserted her on Naxos and sailed on to Athens-neglecting to hoist
a white sail to signal his safety." Upset, his father hurled himself from the
Acropolis or into the sea.'2 Probably it was the sea, it being named after
him (Aegeus).' 3
For these and other exploits, Athens preserved his ship as a memo-
rial' 4 There she is sitting on the beach. Plutarch writes of her.' 5 If a plank
or other part decayed, the Athenians replaced it. Manifestly, she was the
same ship. 6 Here is something of the paradox of the heap, the sorites
paradox, since removing one grain of sand from a pile of sand still leaves a
pile of sand-yet at some stage of progressive removal you have no pile, or
no sand.' Eventually all the parts of the ship of Theseus were replaced.
Hobbes, reading Plutarch, pondered whether the ship kept her identity de-
spite the complete discontinuity of her parts.'8 Go one step beyond to
imagine the parts of the ship replaced successively; and not dispersed, but
reassembled, the two ships standing alongside each other on the shore. Or
the one ship standing alongside herself.'9
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id.
9. See PIERRE BALDI & SOREN BRuNAK, BIo1NFo.MATIcs: THE MACHINE LEARNING
APPROACH21-22 & Plate I, (1998).
10. See DAviEs, supra note 4, at 91.
1i. Id.
12. See Emily Kearns, Theseus, in THE OXFoRD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 1508 (Simon
Homblower & Anthony Spawforth eds., 3d ed. 1996).
13. See DAVIES, supra note 4, at 91.
14. Id.
15. PLUTARCH, Theseus, in THE LivFs OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 3, 14(John Dryden trans., 1834) (1617).
16. Id.
17. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Sorites Paradox (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/>.
18. THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY, in I THE ENGLISH WORKS, 136-
37 (1834) (1656).
19. See Theseus (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
<http:llwww.as.wvu.edulcollO3/phil/Www/theseus.htm>.
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b. We know Raffles v. Wichelhaus from Contracts?' The plaintiff ar-
gued triumphantly and incorrectly that of two ships named Peerless, his
uses of referred to one ship, the uses of the defendant to the other, so that
the parties failed to contract over a sale of cotton ex Peerless?' As Profes-
sor Gilmore points out, the clause 'ex Peerless' means only that were the
ship lost, the contract would conclude. 2 Simpson counts a fleet of ships
named Peerless. The case anticipates Capgras, as we will see?4
c. The Salem raises the inverse perplexity: one ship with two names.
Think back to the oil embargo of 1979: crude is scarce, the market unset-
tled, traders opportunistic and incautious. 5 Our protagonists, crooks, buy
the tanker Salem for $12.3 million oi credit?6 The crooks voyage charter
her to transport 200,000 t6ns of crude from Kuwait to Italy 2 On a voyage
charter, the owners of the vessel, i.e. the crooks, supply captain and crew.2 8
The oil belongs to the charterer.29 Meanwhile, the crooks have sold
200,000 tons of oil in South Africa for $56 million3 Tankers as large as
the Salem cannot negotiate the Suez Canal, and consequently reach Italy
from Kuwait around the Cape of Good Hope 3' The captain and crew,
minions of the crooks, load the agreed crude at Kuwait and proceed down
the east coast of Africa?2 Shell purchases the oil at sea.33 The Salem
reaches Durban as the Lema, her crew having painted out the 'SA' of
'SALEM' and appended an 'A'? 4 The Lema off-loads the oil at Durban,
the crooks collecting the $56 million, of which $12.3 million pays for the
ship.3
The now nearly empty Lema continues toward Italy?6 The crew scut-
20. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
21. Id.
22. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcr 39-47 (2d ed. 1995).
23. See A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two
Ships Peerless, 11 CARwozo L. REv. 287 (1989).
24. See infra Part 3.
25. Shell Int'l Oil Co. v. Gibbs (The Salem), 1 All E.R. 225 Q.B. (1982), CA rev. in
part 1 All E.R. 1057 (1982).
26. Id. at 227.
27. Id. at 225-28.
28. Id. at 227-29.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 227.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 230-32.
34. Id. at 23 1.
35. Id. at 230.
36. Id.
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tie her off the West African coast?7 They set off inconsequential explo-
sions and discharge a puny oil slick.3" The Lema sinks within sight of an-
other ship, who rescues the crew.39 The circumstances are suspicious.40
The crew, sequestered first in Senegal then in Liberia, escape.4' Shell re-
covers some of the loss from the South African purchasers, who converted
the oil, having acquired possession but no title. But most of the proceeds
are gone 2 The marine insurers deny coverage.43 Shell sues them and
loses. 4 The scheme is larceny by trick. 5 The trick happened at Kuwait or
Durban, not at sea, hence the policy does not cover the loss 6 The crooks
are $37.7 million ahead and at large. The admiralty bar thinks this hilari-
ous.4 7
d. Now some history. Lincoln Paine in his fine, usually reliable Ships
of the World writes that the frigate HMS Macedonian "has the distinction
of being the only British warship [the Americans] captured and returned to
an American port during the War of 1812." 4 Not quite, although Paine's
oversight is trivial.49 The frigate USS United States, commanded by
Stephen Decatur, engaged and captured the Macedonian. The victory
was unexpected, especially by the British, who had never lost a frigate in
individual combat." It heartened the Americans who otherwise were not
doing well. 2 But the United States was more boat, rating forty-four guns
to the Macedonian's thirty-eight, being 175' and 2200 tons to 154' and
1082 tons. 3 The disparity makes a legal difference.
The Macedonian, thenceforth an American frigate, has a supporting
role in three cases. Two of the cases apply interesting particulars of the law
of prizes. Prizes were the big incentive in naval life as the novels of
37. Id. at 228, 231-32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Oral communication from Carolyn Shields, Lane Powell Spears Lubersky, (June 5,
1998).
48. LINCOLN P. PAINE, SHIPS OF THE WORLD: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 315
(1997).
49. See infra p. 103.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Patrick O'Brian dramatize!5 4 So here comes the first case. In Decatur v.
Chew, the frigate Chesapeake, under Captain Evans, had captured the Vol-
unteer (evidently a merchantman)5 5 The issue was whether at the time of
capture Evans was under Decatur's command 6 In that case, Decatur got a
twentieth share of the prize, else nothing.57 Decatur sued Chew, the prize
agent, for this portion. Justice Story riding circuit decided for Decatur,
although his command was nominal-a legal fiction.59 For as Story relates,
" Commodore Decatur soon afterwards sailed from Boston, captured the
frigate Macedonian in a memorable engagement, and returned with his
prize to the United States, previous to the sailing of the Chesapeake, and
has ever since been unable to put to sea, in consequence of the superior
blockading squadrons of the enemy."6 Hence Decatur got money while
enjoying Boston 6
In 1814, the sloop-of-war U.3.S. Peacock engaged and defeated the
brig H.MS. EpervierP Both ships were small, although the American ship
(117.9 feet and 509 tons) was stronger, twenty-two guns to eighteen, 160
men to 128.63 The Peacock brought her prize into Savannah (Paine tells us
the war was still on)." Recommissioned, the Epervier fought on the
American side for the rest of the war. Chubb v. United States, in the Court
of Claims, tardily (1859!) settled the prize money from the engagement
(the Epervier carried $117,903, significantly increasing the stakes). 65
"T]he proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken on board of
them, which shall be adjudged good prize," the prize statute directed,
Cc shall, when of equal or superior force to the vessel or vessels making the
capture, be the sole property of the captors, and when of inferior force,
shall be divided between the United States and the officers and men mak-
ing the capture.""6 The 'equal or superior' was the rub. 7 The Peacock
claimed all and got hailf 8 Decatur had gotten all for the Macedonian, but
54. See PATRICK O'BRIAN, 1-16 ThE COMPLETE AuBREY/MARTIN SERIEs (1994).
55. 7 F. Cas. 322 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 3,721).
56. IL
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See PAINE, supra note 48, at 389.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 7 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 195.
66. Idat*I1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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should not have.69 His recovery figured as an unpersuasive precedent in
the plaintiff's Exhibit K.7
Dahigren rather famously invented a naval gun that fired a larger shell
for its weight, used less powder, and was less likely to explode killing eve-
rybody nearby than previous guns. Dahlgren did the inventing while a na-
val officer (ultimately an admiral), the service funding his research. Thus
there was the question, partly answered by a statute particular to the occa-
sion, whether and how much he might recover for his work. In The Dahl-
gren Gun Case the Court of Claims awarded the estate of the inventor
$65,O00. In a letter of 1853 that accompanied his submission of drawings
for the gun, Dahlgren describes the Macedonian as she was then armed
without his guns as embarrassingly inferior to British and French ships.
72
Reviewing these successive cases, decided in 1813, 1859, and 1880,
we start to wonder how a wooden ship (forty acres of oak went into her)
stayed commissioned so long (from the opinions at least until 1853). In-
deed the Macedonian does not disappear from the record until 1922, when
an inn on the Brooklyn waterfront, the Macedonia House, made partly from
her or her timber, bums down. The answer, applying to Lord Nelson's
Victory too, is that a ship may be rebuilt. The Victory was last damaged in
battle at dockside from a German bomb in World War 10 The Macedonia
was rebuilt pursuant to a statute, mostly in 1833. 74 She was rebuilt not in
the anemic sense of being repaired: in 1833 the Macedonian that Decatur
captured stood alongside herself as the ship of Theseus might have stood at
Athens millennia before.
[T]here were now at Gosport two distinctly different Macedonians, a
brand new one awaiting completion, and a seastained old hulk rotting
away on the Virginia mudflats .... The continuing presence of both
versions at the same location threatened to become an embarrass-
ment .... [Tjhe navy could have only one Macedonian, but it was im-
portant [that] the Gosport Macedonian be seen to be, if not the same
vessel, at least the same entity.... Frozen in time, the two versions sat
out the winter of 1833-44 like Jekyll and Hyde, one shining and fresh,
the other scarred and rotten.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 16 Ct. C1. 30, 36-37 (1880).
72 Id.
73. See PAINE, supra note 48, at 550-5 1.
74. JAMES T. DE KAY, CHRONICLES OF ThE FRIGATE MACEDONIAN: 1809-1922, at 203-
04,206 (1995).
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Was she the same ship as the one Biddle brought back from Rio a dec-
ade before?... She looked the same.... The navy would never have
built her if she was merely to be a new ship. The navy wanted-desper-
ately wanted-the same ship that Stephen took as prize on October 12,
1812. The Macedonian that made her way into the Chesapeake was, as
far as men could make her, that very ship. She was the same in size, in
design, and in spirit, insofar as the" guile and determination of John
Rogers and the Board of Naval Commissioners could make her.75
The idea of being a different vessel but the same entity is a na've and
sound application of modal logic.76 We are approaching more of this kind
of thing.
II. SOURCES
You probably think that the legal meanings of the word 'person' arise
from and are parasitic upon antecedent uses in natural language. Black-
stone apparently assumes so when distinguishing, without inquiring after
priorities, natural persons, being "such as the God of nature formed us,"
from artificial persons "created and devised by human laws." 7 Obviously
to Blackstone the Creation antedates human laws. Yet oddly the etymol-
ogy moves in the opposite direction.
a. We earliest encounter nrp6oanov, the Greek cognate of 'per-
son', in Homer.78 The wily Odysseus has returned to Ithaca in disguise
after twenty years' absence besieging and sacking Troy and having adven-
tures.79 The Trojan War was only one in a succession of wars over recipro-
cal woman-stealing, which Davies describes as giving "tit for tit."80 Ar-
gus, the dog of Odysseus, recognizes him, wags his tail, and dies.8'
Odysseus does not know what kind of welcome otherwise to expect 8 2 So
still disguised he approaches his wife Penelope, claiming to be the friend
and companion of himself (he looks like a beggar but is anything but). 3
Penelope has not seen him for two decades; 4 and in my experience and
Odysseus' your average dog surpasses human companions in memory and
75. Id.
76. See ANIL GuPTA, THE LOGIC OF COMMON NouNs (1980); G.E. HUGHES & M.J.
CRESWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODALLOGIC (1996).
77. 1 WILLA BLACKSTONE, COiM MEuAES 123 (1809).
78. HOMER, ODYSSEY 201-58 (Richard Lattimore trans., 1967).
79. Id.
80. DAviss, supra note 4, at xvi.
81. Id. at260-61.
82. Id.
83. Id. at283-91.
84. Id. at 1.
1998]
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fidelity. Discommoded by 108 suitors, Penelope has been entertaining
them while putting them off.85 Odysseus (with modest help from his per-
ennially immature son Telemachos) will kill them all. 6
The servant Eurykleia is Odysseus' old nurse.87 She is twenty years
older too.8 Offering Odysseus customary hospitality, Penelope directs,
"Come then, circumspect Eurykleia, rise up and wash the feet of one who
is the same age as your master. Odysseus must by this time have just such
hands and feet as you do, for in misfortune mortal men grow old more sud-
denly."8 9 Washing his feet, Eurykleia recognizes Odysseus by a sear on
his thigh a boar inflicted.9 Odysseus was hunting with his grandfather,
"who surpassed all men in thievery and the art of the oath." 91 Circumspect
Eurykleia may be, yet she is moved:
ypqfis 5 yo('CaXe'ro Xepo11tp6oco 0C2
Eurykleia is weeping (literally, shedding hot tears).93 But exactly
what else is she doing? ypi Os is 'old woman'-i.e. Eurykleia. 89 is a
particle we need not translate. ircoxe'ro is 'covered'. XEp cd is 'with
her hands'. We are left with 7ip6owcora, neuter accusative plural (Homer
always uses the plural). wxt ,cXrxEt o is the middle voice, indicating that
Eurykleia acts on something that belongs to her. So you have this image of
this old woman sobbing. What does she do with her hands? Look at the
image. Stanford has us translate "covered her face with her hands." 94 Her
face belongs to her and is a physical thing, or the surface of a physical
thing.
Of course Penelope was twenty years older too, and Odysseus did not
stay long in Ithaca. Tennyson recounts his restless discontent: "It little
profits that an idle king, / By this still hearth, among these barren crags, /
Match'd with an aged wife, I mete and dole / Unequal laws unto a savage
race .... ," 9 Hence he is off on a ship, with words that we may underinter-
pret as a claim of identity: "that which we are we are." 
96
"b. The oracle at Delphi has warned Laius and Jocasta, king and queen
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 321-34.
87. Id at291.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 292.
91. Id.
92. 2 HOMER, ODYSSEY 112 (William B. Stanford ed., 2d ed. 1965).
93. Id. at 291.
94. Id. at 330, n.361.
95. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, POEMS OFTENNYSON 164 (1916).
96. Id. at 165.
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of Thebes, not to have a son, lest he kill his father and marry his mother.97
They have CEdipus, despite the warning.98 One hardly doubts the Oracle
knew they would have son, as in Calvinist belief, which we are coming too,
God knew Adam would transgress. Jocasta gives the infant to a shepherd
to expose, somewhat standard practice, so she imagines she and Laius are
in the clear.99 Disobeying Jocasta, the shepherd gives (Edipus to a shep-
herd from Corinth with whom he shares summer pasture.10 (Edipus grows
up thinking that he is the son of the king and queen of Corinth. 10' He too
visits the oracle at Delphi, wh6 tells him the same thing: that he will kill his
father and marry his mother."0 2 So he knows what to do. On the road from
Athens, where it forks, (Edipus turns left to Thebes instead of right to Cor-
inth."°3 He cannot kill his parents at'a distance, he reasons.0 4 Unaware
that Laius is a king or his father, (Edipus kills him at a crossroads. 05 The
shepherd escorts Laius and witnesses this too.0 6 The shepherd is around a
lot, finally confessing to (Edipus that he did not kill him as Jocasta or-
dered. 7 You can see a photograph of the shepherd or some shepherd at
The Classics Pages.08
(Edipus solves the riddle of the Sphinx, who was oppressing Thebes
(what walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs in
the evening?-mAn); and, becoming king of Thebes, marries the widowed
Jocasta.1°9 Now he is in big trouble. At the start of Sophocles' (Edipus
Tyrannus, plague afflicts Thebes, ostensibly brought on by the murderer of
Laius being at large, polluting the city."' (Edipus summons Tiresias to
identify the murderer'
It is worth pausing briefly at Tiresias. He is blind. (Edipus Tyran-
nus, like Lear, has much play on sight.) Here is how Tiresias became
97. The Classics Pages: The Old Shepherd (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/-oxias/oldshepherd.htm>.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The Classics Pages: The Riddle of the Sphinx (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/-loxiassphinx.htm>.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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blind.' 2 He was changed into a woman for a while.13 I will not go into
the causes, but he is changed back now. Zeus and Hera are bickering as
usual, this time over the somewhat metaphysical question, who enjoys sex
more, men or women?" 4 Zeus is saying that his infidelities, while a royal
duty, are a burden to him. Hera is very much put off. The decision proce-
dure here is to ask Tiresias: having been both, he alone knows. The ques-
tion has something to do with the methodological error in economics of
comparing utilities across persons, and raises interesting identity issues
connected with rigid designators."' Yet I have only so much time. Tire-
sias answers that women do by a factor of nine, and Hera blinds him.
16
Tiresias being a blind seer knows who killed Laius but is not telling
CEdipus, who threatens him:
117
ob -r6 a6v 8eiaag icp6a~o~ov.
Tiresias is responding to (Edipus' threats. He tells (Edipus that he
does not (ob) fear (8eiaag) something (7rp6ozorov) that belongs to
CEdipus." 8 A note by Jebb instructs: "np6oawnov: 'thy face,'-thy angry
presence: the blind man speaks as though he saw the 'vultus instantis tyr-
anni.' Not, 'thyperson' (i.e. thy royal quality): -z p6ocn ov is not classi-
cal in this sense.""1 9 Horace and Tacitus use the quoted Latin phrase.
Yeats translates up6acoirov as 'frown'. 2 ° Here the term has shifted
from unequivocally naming (the surface of) a physical thing to naming
something less concrete: in the first instance a face that shows anger. By
synecdoche we reach the underlying anger, Tiresias being blind. Even the
mistranslation that Jebb cautions against would have 7c p 6 a won o v refer to
a role rather than to a colloquial person.
CEdipus will find out that he has killed his father and married his
mother. Jocasta, understanding before him and failing to persuade him to
stop asking, will hang herself CEdipus will tear at his eyes with Jocasta's
broach, blinding himself. The chorus have the last lines: "Now as we keep
our watch and wait the final day, / count no man happy till he dies, free of
112. See Greek Mythological Characters: Tiresias (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.cybercomm.net/-grandpagrkgdstz.html>.
113. Id.
114. Id,
115. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1982).
116. See supra note 112.
117. See William Harris, Greek'Myth: Medicine and Pharacopoeia (visited Nov. 3,
1998) <http://www.middle bury.edu/-harrisGreekMyth/chap5Medicine.html>.
118. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPusTYRRANus 55 (Richard C. Jebb ed., 4th ed. 1912).
119. Id.
120. SOPHOCLES, EDIPuS REx (William Butler Yeats trans., Caedmon Recording TC
2012, 1957).
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pain at last." 2 Classical opinion occasionally goes beyond this, reserving
judgment until we see how a person's children turn out. Of course why
stop there?-God in the Old Testament did not.
c. 7t p 6 arw& ov also appears twice together biblically and familiarly
in St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians. 22
P167croliev y&p &wi, t ' ic61mpou iv aiviyl-cca,
t6Te 8i icp6ownov rp6s up6acarov.'1 3
New Testament Greek is simpler than classical Greek, approaching
ordinary speech. gOl.toLev is 'we see'. 24 8o67rT'pov (8UoTtpov)
is 'mirror'. 12s a iviy Ia is 'a dark saying' (ef. 'enigma'). 2 6 The King
James Version127 and Lattimore128 translate the first clause similarly: "For
now we see through a glass, darkly... ," 129 and "But now we see by a
mirror, obscurely .... ,1 Certainly Lattimore is more accurate, but you
can't beat the King James Version for language. They continue identically:
"... but then face to face." 3' St. Paul carries the initial metaphor of sight,
sustained throughout Sophcles' (Edipus, 32 through the passage, so that the
matching instances of 'face' may be read literally as denoting the physical
thing, as in Homer,13 3 and figuratively, importing comprehension.
d. Here at the other end of the story from Blackstone is where the law
enters. The shift in the meaning of Tp6 a ca 7 o v is from face (Homer and
in not completely a physical sense St. Paul) to dramatic mask or expression
(Sophocles) to dramatic role. 34 7r p 6 uacar ov or its Latin cognate persona
then changes from specifying a dramatic role to specifying a legal role. So
we reach religion. Christianity, although with grace easy to believe, is no-
121. SOPHoCLEs, Oedipus the King, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS, 1351-53 (Robert
Fagles trans., 1982).
122. 1 Corinthians 13:12, in THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (Barbara Aland et al. ed.,
4th rev. ed. 1994).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id
127. WALTER BAUR, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE'NEW TESTAMENT AND OTHER
EARLY CHRIST-AN LrrERAT'rE 720-21 (William F. Arndt & F. Wilber Gingrich, eds. 2d ed.
1919).
128. THE NEW TESTAMENT 378 (Richmond Lattimore trans., 1996).
129. BAUR, supra note 127, at 720-21.
130. THENEWTFsTAMENm, supra note 128, at 378.
131. Id
132. See supra p. 108 and note 120.
133. See supra p. 106 and note 92.
134. See HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT Scowt, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1533
(Henry S. Jones ed., rev. ed. 1977).
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toriously hard to explain. Hence exactly what one believes is unclear.
Typically the Church Fathers (most engagingly, Tertullian) were Roman
lawyers, who in their helpful clarifications naturally, indeed inevitably,
used the Latin legal vocabulary at hand to express the new Christian ideas.
So Tertullian interpreted God as an especially vindictive judge in criminal
court.'35 The Trinity became legal entities-i.e. persons: God in three per-
sons. 136 Hirzel, who has studied the etymology more deeply than anyone
else, teaches us that persons "appeared as bearers of legal relations, and as
such easily came to be talked about in ordinary language, the more so be-
cause the life of the people was mixed thoroughly with legal relations." 1
37
As still it is.
III. CAPGRAS
a. Start with Leibniz's law (or Leibniz's lie).138 More descriptively it
is the principle of the identity of indiscemibles. It asserts that if two things
(x and y) have all (represented by the initial parentheses) their properties
(F) in common, they are the same thing (x =y).139
Equation 1: (F) (Fx <-> Fy) -o x = y.
That is for every property F, if x has F if and only ify has F, then x is
identical to y.14 0 Res judicata presupposes this. Leibniz's law neglects as-
pects of modal logic, hence its name 'Leibniz's lie' among philosophers
who reason semantically in possible worlds.
141
b. Think about my friend Kraut, then a student, now a professor of
philosophy at Ohio State University. He met Rebecca. He was as Erd6s
would say captured. t4 Soon he began to worry obsessively that Rebecca
loved him for his properties, not for himself (by properties I mean qualities,
not wealth, which he lacked). His properties were not that great, hence had
135. See HASKINGS RASHDALI, THE IDEA OF ATONEMENT IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 254
(1920).
136. See ALFRED N. WHrIEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY
342, 343 (1978).
137. RUDOLF HIRZEL, DIE PERSON: BEGRIFF UND NAME DERSELBEN IN ALTERTUM 51
(reprint ed. 1976).
138. See Identity ofIndiscernables, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (visited
Nov. 5, 1998) <http://plato.stanford.edu/-entries/identity-indiscemible/>.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Nuel Belnap taught us the name.
142 See PAUL HOFFMAN, THE MAN WHO LOVED ONLY NUMBERS: THE STORY OF PAUL
ERDos AND THE SEARCH FOR MATHEMATICAL TRUTH; BRUCE SCHECHTER, MY BRAIN Is
OPEN: THE MATHEMATICAL JOURNEY OF PAUL ERDos (1998).
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I been Kraut (or someone exactly like him), I would have settled for love
any way it came down. But my properties are not that great either. Kraut
wanted Rebecca to love him as a Lockean substance, a bare particular, an
entity stripped of its properties. 43 That is if Kraut had different properties,
for instance if Kraut were a turnip, Rebecca would love him just as much.
Or if he had no properties. Of course maybe Kraut could not be a turnip (is
no turnip in any possible world). But I doubt that, knowing Kraut.
c. Ohio convicted Fred Milo of murdering his brother Dean. 4 4 Milo
appealed, precipitating State v. Milo,145 which affirmed the conviction in an
opinion by Judge Norris. We can be grateful for the case while deploring
Milo's act that made it possible. Let me state the facts: you will see imme-
diately that Milo will not get off. He and his siblings Dean and Sophie
were the children of Sotir Milo, founder of the Milo Beauty and Barber
Supply Co.'46 Sotir intended that the children succeed him as owners and
managers.'47 Things did not work out that way. Dean was CEO. 48 He
removed Fred and Sophie from the board, then fired them.' 9 He removed
Sotir from the board. 50 Understandably Milo did not like this. He might
have hired an attorney. Instead he hired a hit man, Harris, who caught up
with Dean in Akron.' Harris told Dean to lie on the floor and when he
did so shot him in the head. i 2 Then, Harris placed a pillow over Dean's
head and shot him again.'53 So Dean was dead.',"
Unwisely Milo had not located Harris in the yellow pages under 'Sol-
diers of Fortune'.15 He had asked around; everyone he asked was willing
to help, but then rolled over and testified against him.'56 So did Harris.
Hence Milo was left holding the bag-but it was his bag. Milo
half-heartedly objected to rulings that admitted all this testimony, and, his
objections failing, pleaded insanity. 57 His hopeful appellate brief asserts:
143. See The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: John Locke (1632-1704) (visited
Nov. 5, 1998) < http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/Ulocke.htm>.
144. State v. Milo, 451 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio App. 1982).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1255.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1257.
157. .!d. at 1256.
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FRED MILO was in a state of raging internal conflict, despite his exter-
nal submission to both his brother Dean's and his parents' conflicting
pressures and demands. The treatment meted out by Dean was not only
threatening family unity and the family business, it was uncharacteristic
and grossly disrespectful to the head of the family. Determining that
Dean could not be acting in such a manner, FRED decided that a sub-
stitute was destroying thb family (emphasis added).
The Defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Emanuel Tanay, a foren-
sic psychiatrist, who concluded after extensive interviews, review of the
tapes of those interviews, research into family and ethnic background,
and study of the statements which the alleged co-conspirators gave con-
cerning FREDERICK MILO'S conduct, that FREDERICK MILO suf-
fered from a paranoid disorder, and had a paranoid delusion that his
brother had been replaced (Capgras' syndrome); such mental illness
caused a severe defect in his rational powers, leading him to act to solve
the terrible family and business conflict by removing its source-Dean
Milo's replacement. FREDERICK MILO, in the doctor's opinion, was
unable to refrain from acting in such a manner (emphasis added).,
So Milo did not believe he was killing Dean but some intruder like
Dean.159 This is not a winning argument. The trial court did not buy it.160
Judge Norris did not buy it 161
d. Yet there is such a syndrome, which nicely implicates the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles and evokes the problem that preoccupied
Kraut. As the appellate brief indicates, sufferers from Capgras believe that
persons close to them have been spirited away, replaced by identical im-
postors. Capgras assumes many forms, one of which, the inverse Capgras,
has the removed person as close as she can get to the sufferer of this dis-
ease. That is the sufferer believes that she herself has been thus replaced.
Maybe a replacement cannot be exactly identical, lest there be no basis to
suspect her. The syndrome appears only thrice in the case law, a second
case being like (yet not exactly like) Milo.'62 The criminal defendant lost
here too. 63
158. Id. at 1258.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. People v. Singer, 628 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ill. App. 1993); see also In re Sea, 904
P.2d 182 (Ore.App. 1995). The first case is Milo.
163. Id. at 596.
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IV. GOD
And when the woman saw that the tree
was good for food, and that it was
pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be
desired to make one wise, she took of
the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave
also unto her husband with her, and he
did eat.
- Genesis 2:4.
a. As I mentioned, the Church Father Tertullian represented God as a
judge in criminal court."' Calvin (and antecedently, St. Augustine) taught
that God holds us to account for the sin of Adam.' 65 The antelapsarian un-
derstanding of original sin asserts that before God created Adam, God
knew that he would fall (how could God being omniscient not know?) but
created him anyway. 6 Only 100,000 among us will be saved. 67 God se-
lects these arbitrarily, lest a rule diminish his sovereign power. 6 Hence,
faith does not help. Neither do good works. The nice thing about this way
to think is that one cannot bargain with God-which preserves everyone's
dignity. Talk about unequal bargaining power.
The American theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards had this
problem: by the middle of the eighteenth century, to the uninstructed, the
Calvinist doctrine lacked transparent, i.e. self-evident truth. Hence, he ex-
plained and justified original sin by recourse to the criminal law, 169 much
as Tertullian did in other circumstances. 7 The theological effort is poorly
received by the uninitiated (it is best to be born a Calvinist). The extreme
assessment of this justification compares Edwards unfavorably to Himmler,
on the ground that Himmler at least understood he did wrong. Remorse is a
good thing.17'
Edwards presented what corresponds to a relative consistency proof
that original sin is acceptable. 72 Here is an example of a relative consis-
164. Seesuprap. 110.
165. See RASHDALL, supra note 135, at 89-90.
166. JOHN CALVIN, CONCERNING THE ETERNAL PREDESTINATION OF GOD 19 (K.S.
Reid trans., 1961).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. JoNATHAN EDWARDS, THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN
DEFENDED, in 2 THE WORKS 305 (Sidney Austin ed., 9th ed. 1858) (1758).
170. Seesuprap. 13.
171. See Jonathan Bennett, The Conscience ofHucldeberry Finn, 49 PHIL. 123 (1974).
172. EDWARDS, supra note 169, at 309.
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tency proof: that we cannot prove Euclidean geometry consistent is a con-
sequence of Gddel's incompleteness theorems. 73 Nor can we often prove
that an esoteric geometry that we favor is consistent. But often we can
prove that if Euclidean geometry is consistent, our geometry is too. Like-
wise, Edwards proved (or believed he proved) that if the criminal law is
acceptable, so is God's punishing us for Adam's sin. 14
Here is Edwards' proof (substitute justice for consistency). It also
borrows from Locke.' The power of God sustains us in existing. God's
doing so is equivalent to God's creating us anew each instant,176 hence our
existence at each instant is a separate existence. So, if we consider matters
strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects,
existing at different times, but what depends on "God's sovereign consti-
tution." 171 Think of persons then as temporal successions of these indi-
viduals each of which exists only at a single instant. We lIunish one of
them (existing at timel for instance) for what another of them (existing at
time0) did. And this is all that God does, connecting Adam to us. Hence,
if the criminal law is just, what God does by punishing us for the sin of
Adam.is correspondingly just."8
b. Before anesthetic, surgical procedures were painful. Perhaps still
they are; introspection does not decide the issue, as we will see shortly.
History first:
The man who advanced amputation most in this country was Robert
Liston (1794-1847), Professor of Surgery at University College Hospi-
tal, and he performed the first operation under anaesthesia there on 21
December 1846. He held the reputation as 'The fastest man with a knife
in England'-so necessary if the patient were not to die of pain and
shock. He was a giant of a man with great physical strength, his arms
and hands likened to Hercules, who loved the job and operated with
great zest and relish, often cutting notches on his knives for each opera-
tion in which they had been used. He was said to be a fearsome sight
when operating as he held the knife between his teeth while he tied the
173. Stephen C. Kleene, The Work of Kurt Gddeh 41 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 761, 763
(1976).
174. EDWARDS, supra note 169, at 309.
175. See The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: John Locke (1632-1704) (James
Fieser et al. Eds., 1998), supra note 143.
176. See DUNS ScoTus, GOD AND CREATURES 274 (Felix Alluntis & Allen B. Wolter
trans.1975) (1580); RENA DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY, in I THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 131, 168 (Elizabeth Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds.,
1970) (1641).
177. EDWARDS, supra note 169, at 340.
178. See RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, PERSON AND OBJEcT: A METAPHYSICAL STUDY
(1977).
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ligature on the blood vessels. He would amputate a thigh single-handed,
compress the artery with the left hand, using no tourniquet, and do all
the cutting and sewing with the right hand. One man was so terrified at
the thought of his impending operation he went and hid in the lavatory.
Liston strode after him, cut open the lock with his amputation knife,
hauled him out, strapped him down, and cut for stone in two minutes.
He was once said to be so anxious to break his own record for speed
(and bets were placed on his performance) that in amputating a leg he
took off one of the patient's testicles and two of his assistant's fingers at
the same time.179
Anesthesia purportedly alleviates surgical pain. Curare is "a black-
ish-brown resinous bitter substance, obtained as an extract from Strychnos
toxifera, and other plants of tropical South America." 80 It is "used by the
Indians to poison their arrows. When introduced into the blood it acts as a
powerful poison, arresting the action of the motor nerves.""8s Curare was
the anesthetic of choice in the 1940's. Patients given it reported pain in
surgery, but surgeons disbelieved them. The use of the drug continued un-
til a medical doctor tried it out and uniexpectedly felt pain too.
Amnestics make you forget. A bomffi6n amnestic is scopolamine
(C1 7H2 1N04), a belladonna alkaloid used also in light doses to prevent
motion sickness. 18 2 Surgeons use curare as a general anesthetic today com-
bined with an amnestic. "Sometimes," an anesthesiologist called promi-
nent remarks, "when we think a patient may have been awake during sur-
gery, we give scopolamine to get us off the hook. Sometimes it works and
sometimes not." '1 3 The idea is that the patient experiences but forgets the
pain.' 84
Perhaps pain is merely remembering. A legal issue relates to persons
understood as individuals arbitrarily (conventionally) connected, as Ed-
wards argued."' 5 Think why we care about our future or past as opposed to
our present pain. The care is a kind of altruism. Patients are curiously dis-
sociated from, often completely indifferent to, the prospect of forgotten
pain, as though it were not they who experience it. The legal issue then is
whether the individual who is connected to and speaks on behalf of the in-
179. ELIZABETH BENNION, ANTIQUE MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS 55 (1979).
180. OXFORD ENGLISH DicnioNARY (2d ed. CD-ROM 1992).
181. Id.
182. See SAIUNG WORLD, March 1998, at21-22.
183. Quoted in DANIEL C. DENNETr, BRAINsToRMs: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND
AND PSYCHOLOGY 210 n.* (1978).
184. See Drakon Nikolinakos, General Anesthesia, Consciousness, and the Skeptical
Challenge, 91 J. PHIL. 88 (1994).
185. EDWARDS, supra note 169, at 340.
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dividual who awakens after surgery, yet is uninterested in the pain of the
individual(s) who suffer during it, is properly their surrogate: can consent
for them. The theory reads itself out of court, making the threat of legal
liability of the surgeon or the consenting individual to the individuals who
experience the pain remote. Neither the consenting individual nor the sur-
geon exists to compensate. Nor do the victims exist to be compensated.
Probably the individual who might sue lacks standing. You cannot step
into the same river twice, because it is not the same river, and you are not
the same you.
c. Land law, the common law of estates, works something like origi-
nal sin, connecting colloquial persons. For an English fee tail, from the
fourteenth through the nineteenth centuries, there are three candidate enti-
ties for legal persons: colloquial persons, families, land. Simpson, Holmes,
and Marx, advocate them respectively.
Simpson (the same Simpson who writes of ships) I8 6 in the second edi-
tion of his A History of the Land Law writes of the importance of the
landed estate as a source of family power. 7 The strict settlement let Eng-
lish families keep their properties intact over successive generations and
centuries. The controlling principle was that a tenant in tail never come
into possession of the estate-that possession be always kept in a life ten-
ant. 88 Otherwise the tenant in tail could break the entail by common re-
covery. 9 The counterparts in conveyancing of Edwardian constituent in-
dividuals are the successive tenants. The larger entity is the family.
"[E]ntailed lands were treated as family property, not the property of any
individual, but the theory of the law did not explicitly recognize the family
as an entity capable of owning," Simpson writes.'" "So an underlying
conception of family ownership had to be expressed in terms of individuals
holding estates in land." 191
Earlier we met Holmes likewise writing of ships-as persons.' 92 Later
in The Common Law he quotes Baron Parke going linguistically, probably
also conceptually, beyond Simpson to assert that the privity between an
ancestor and his heir is identity of person. 93 Holmes then invokes the term
186. See supra p. 101.
187. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 235 (2d ed. 1986).
188. Id. at235.
189. Id. at 233-40.
190. Id at 90.
191. Id.
192. See supra p. 99.
193. HoLMEs, supra note 1, at 272.
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persona, the Latin cognate of 'person', 194 explaining that although in Ro-
man law the persona is "the aggregate of the ancestor's rights and duties,"
in English law "[E]very fee is a distinct persona.""'9 I cannot make out
the extent of synecdoche here: whether the land (if one reads the sentence
literally) or the sequence of tenants (as the reference to Parke suggests) is
the persond. The result is plainer, more hyperbolic, and more metaphorical
ih Marx, who writes, "The beneficiary of the entail, the eldest son, belongs
to the land. The land inherits him." 196
V. MULTIPLES
a. "Who would have guessed," Elaine Showalter writes in the pref-
ace to the paperback edition of her instructive Hystories, that "a Wisconsin
doctor would be sued for diagnosing a patient with 120 personalities, in-
cluding a duck, and for billing her insurance company for group ther-
apy?" 197 Edwards' individuals are diachronic: one individual eats the ap-
ple, commits the crime; another individual is punished for it. The criminal
individual no longer exists. The individuals-ducks and so forth-that con-
stitute a sufferer from multiple personalities, that is, dissociative identity
disorder (DID), are synchronic, or at least less diachronic, conceptually
allowing, if notjustifying, the billing for group therapy.'98
The pathogen of DID is sexual abuse in childhood.'99 DID is a de-
fense: the victim conjures others to protect her or to suffer in her place. It
is not happening to her. In the early history of the disease, two alters were
usual, including the host; but their numbers have multiplied.' 1' One hun-
dred twenty is still on the high side. Often transitions among alters are
striking and abrupt.20' Some alters may not know of others?2 Especially,
the host self may be unaware that she suffers from DID until treatment-
even deny her disease early in therapy.20 3 In these refractive cases her thera-
pist must teach her to understand her condition.2 4 An alter may observe
194. See supra p. 109.
195. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 274.
196. Quoted in A. Brian Simpson, Introduction to Book 11, in 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES atiii (1991).
197. ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYSTORiES at ix (1997).
198. EDWARDS, supra note 169.
199. See IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE
SCIENCES OF MEMORY 55 (1995).
200. Idl
201. Id at27.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id
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other alters, themselves unaware of the observer." 5 Or alters may jointly
undertake projects, argue, snarl, or console. Although DID occurs in epi-
demic proportions throughout North America, it is nearly unknown else-
where.20 6 The exception is the Netherlands, to which the disease has been
carried by medical apostles, much as by some accounts sailors accompa-
nying Columbus brought syphilis from the New World.
2 7
The attorney not herself thus afflicted must view victims of DID with
pity and empathy, while preparing sensitively to counsel and sue them and
their physicians. I am told confidentially of an instance yet unresolved in
which a host personality desperately seeks and receives psychiatric help,
while an alter sues the provider of this help for malpractice. Or perhaps the
host is undertaking the litigation. Often it is hard to discern who is the le-
gal entity.
b. Or perhaps everyone is a legal entity, as in Wall v. Fairview Hos-
pital?"8 Routt was a psychiatrist.0 9 Physician heal thyself. Two of his
patients, Slavik and Wall, sue his estate, nurse, and hospital for malprac-
tice, negligence, and so forth.210 Routt, Slavik, and Wall had been sexually
abused as children.211 Also, Routt's wife did not love him, even with his
properties.212 Eventually Routt committed suicide? 13 Slavik and Wall al-
lege that he sexually abused some of their alters, swearing everyone to se-
crecy.2 14
Here is how the plaintiffs' case went:
Counsel for Slavik called forth: Jessica, who witnessed the abuse of
Elizabeth; Elizabeth, age four, who testified to sexual abuse from
Slavik's father and Dr. Routt; and Anne, age ten, who testified to abuse
by Dr. Routt ....
Similarly, counsel for Wall was able to call out: Kay, age eight, who
testified to abuse by Dr. Routt, both in his office and in the general
"smoking room" in the hospital; Tootie Kay, age three, who testified
that, in addition to Wall's grandfather and another man, the doctor
abused her and "the Little Girls" and told them to keep his conduct a
secret; and Michael, a teenager, who witnessed the doctor abuse Kay
205. Id.
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id.
208. Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Seres., 568 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. 1997).
209. Id. at 197.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 198.
212. Id. at 198-99.
213. Id. at 197.
214. Id. at 198.
[Vol. 49:1
Seven Episodes of Personal Identity in Law
and the Little Girls. When Kay began to testify, she requested a special
soft shirt of a friend because he "makes me feel safe. ' 215
There are many witnesses to the abuse because the court treats each of
Slavik, Wall, Jessica, Elizabeth, Anne, Kay, Tootle Kay, etc. as legal enti-
ties.2t6 But only for some purposes: the treatment raises issues of standing,
of hearsay.2 17 For instance, how can Wall recover for abuses to Tootle
Kay? Imagine cross-examining Tootie Kay.
The trial court directs a verdict for the nurse and dismisses the claims
against her.218 It also dismisses some claims against the other defen-
dants? 19 The jury finds for Slavik and Wail on every claim presented to
them 20 The plaintiffs appeal the directed verdict and the dismissal of the
claims against the nurse? 1 Norton, J., in the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reverses the dismissal of some claims and otherwise affirms 22
c. The sticking point is the testimony of the alters. The appellate
court does not know what to do here. Neither does it reflect long upon its
choices: a court must do one thing or another, decide the case. Wall is un-
precedented in Minnesota and almost everywhere. American Home Assur-
ance Co. v. Smith is the only nearly identical case?' Here, a therapist
doubtless-abused someone (concealed police witnessed him do it), although
the identity (which alter?) of the victim was uncertain. 4 The issue in
Smith was insurance coverage? -  Cases with a family resemblance in-
volving recovered memories recently have shifted their focus from criminal
actions against abusers to civil suits by the accused against the therapists
who recovered the memories2 26
We have these extravagant possibly true claims of abuse. Slavik and
Wall do not remember being abused. The court accepfs the claims because
the jury does. Or, Norton just washes his hands of the issue. The nurse
"approaches this case by attacking the c7redibility of various witnesses and
arguing that Slavik and Wall were per se prone to concocting bizarre and
215. Id. at 199.
216. Id.
217. This from discussions with David Fitzgerald and Carolyn Shields.
218. 568 N.W.2d. at 194.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 462 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. App. 1995).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See State v. Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916 (N.H. 1997); Hungerford v. Jones, 988 F.
Supp. 22 (D.N.H. 1997).
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incredible stories because they suffer from DID," Norton relates. "Such
arguments were better placed before the jury at trial." 227
Wall confines a trial court more closely than Dauber2" does a federal
district court: as clarified by Joiner 29 Daubert would test determinations
of methodological reliability below only for abuse of discretion. 030 Dau-
bert allows a lot of discretion? 31 Hence, a federal district court can more
easily exclude the testimony of alters.
Wall is intractable. Watch tapes of DID: I see patients pretending to
be alters, doctors pretending to believe them-the acting level is low. "Dis-
sociative Identity Disorder must be distinguished from Malingering in
situations where there may be financial or forensic gain," the authoritative
and politically responsive DSM-Vcautions. 32 I count three possibilities in
order of increasing medical gravity: DID is a fantasy of psychiatrists, iatro-
genic, or actual ('actual' means antedating therapy). Probably each cate-
gory has cases. An interesting new book, Guilty by Reason of Insanity by
the psychiatrist Dorothy Lewis, makes a compelling case for the reality of
the disease.?23 She is smart and believes there is such a thing. So we
should too. This despite or because of her pervasive distrust of attorneys,
infantile sense of humor, and eagerness to subordinate her views to those of
some male colleagues.
Freud famously identified the pathogen of the neuroses of his female
patients as their being sexually molested as children, then recantedP 4 It
takes a Tertullian (the incarnation "is by all means to be believed, because
it is absurd")35 to accept every claim of abuse. Splitting is dividing into
alters. "I remember splitting for the first time when I was about four and
my father was trying to force me to sodomize my pet rabbit with a roofing
nail," a patient recounts. "When I came back to myself after the experi-
ence there were three parts of me... Benjamin-ageless, spiritual, and pro-
tective; Bunny-little and worried; ... ,, 236 Yet the subjects of the book by
227. 568 N.W.2d at 204.
228. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
229. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
230. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
231. Id.
232. AMERICAN PsYcHIATRiC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 487 (4th ed. 1994).
233. See DOROTHY OTNow LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST
EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998).
234. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991); JANET MALCOLM. IN
THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984).
235. Max More, In Praise of the Devil (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.Iucifer.com/lucifer.html>.
236. Joan Acocella, The Politics of Hysteria, NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 1998, at 65.
[Vol. 49:1
Seven Episodes of.Personal Identity in Law
Lewis, among them sufferers of DID, routinely endure and inflict abuses as
bad as this.
Wall evokes the Salem trials, 7 in which children testified to abuse by
the defendants-sometimes happening to them on the witness stand. So
they would cry out that X, in the defendants' box, was jabbing them with
pins right now. A difference is that twenty-two people died in Salem, no
one as a result of Wall. That DID manifests itself only to physicians
trained to treat it proves nothing, being consistent with their finding or pro-
voking the disease. Russian peasants in the nineteenth century correlated
outbreaks of plague with doctors dispatched to treat it. They killed the
doctors, confusing cause with effect, as a lay witness with DID is prone to
do. Ninety percent of multiples are female.38 Acocella polemically mod-
els the pathogen of DID not as childhood sexual abuse but as present disil-
lusion? 9 Many women-undereducated, and immobilized by parenthood-
do not share the conspicuous triumphs (still incomplete) of women in the
last decades: they want to go to law school but can't. Their declaration of
DID provides two benefits. It relieves them of responsibility for their pre-
dicament (their fathers caused it with roofing nails). And it offers entry
into the close-knit and sympathetic community of multiples (treatment,
support groups, newsletters in which one can publish one's poetry). Yet
that being sick has advantages does not demonstrate that no one is actually
sick. Also, as Hacking describes throughout the best philosophical inquiry
into DID,240 pleas for help tak e socially determined forms: from hysteria in
the time of Freud to DID in ours. But again, that DID is partly conven-
tional does not disprove it.
d. Still, something elusive troubles Wall. It comes down to the role
of the jury. Approach obliquely, with the verdict of a tribal court that is the
subject of Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. PRed Wolf.241 The Burling-
ton Northern had run down and killed two Crow women, a mother and
daughter, at a grade crossing?42 The women were, at the time of the acci-
dent, intoxicated.24 3 The train was where one should expect it to be, on its
tracks.244 It was travelling forty miles per hour-twenty miles per hour un-
237. See, e.g., FRANCES HILL, A DELUSION OF SATAN: THE FULL STORY OF THE SALEM
WrCH TRIALS (1997).
238. See Acocella, supra note 236, at 65.
239. Id.
240. See HACKING, supra note 199, at 15.
241. 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1997).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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der the speed limit 45 The railroad had not killed anyone right there in
forty years?46
Relatives of the deceased sue the Burlington Northern in tribal
court? 47 The judge addresses the jury in Crow. 4' The railroad lawyers do
not understand Crow?49 He tells the jurors that bodies are scattered along
the railway 50 He tells them that being Crow, they know what to do?"s All
except one of the jurors are relatives of the plaintiffs? 52 The railroad law-
yers do not know what is happening. The jurors do know what to do, re-
turning a verdict that the Burlington Northern pay the plaintiffs
$250,000,000?53 To appeal within the tribal system, the Burlington North-
ern must post bond for that amount. So the railroad is stuck. There is no
way it will turn over $250,000,000 to Indian Country. The Constitution
does not require state courts to respect the resulting judgment, to give it full
faith and credit, because the Crow reservation is not a state2 4 Enforce-
ment, if at all, is by comity. But the Crow can tear up the tracks and sell
them for scrap. It is analytic or nearly so that a railroad without tracks op-
erates at a handicap. And that the tracks must run from one end of the rail-
road to the other uninterrupted, somewhat as legs must be long enough to
reach from the trunk to the ground.
The district court enjoins the tribal court; and the Ninth Circuit re-
verses over a strong dissent, deciding the railroad must exhaust tribal
remedies?" The Supreme Court vacates and remands s6 for consideration
in light of Strate v. A-1 Contractors.57 That case decided that a tribal court
lacks jurisdiction over non-tribal travelers upon a federal or state high-
way.258 Hence the remand suggests that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction
over Burlington Northern, because the railway is something like a highway,
or because the road that intersects it at the grade crossing is exactly that.
Jurors do not write on a tabula rasa (more Locke). 9 They come to
245. Id.
246. Id
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. Id
253. Id.
254. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
255. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 106 F.3d at 868.
256. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
257. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
258. Id.
259. See The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: John Locke (1632-1704), supra
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court trailing prior probabilities, adjust these priors in the light of evidence
to reach posterior probabilities, and determine verdicts by these posteriors.
Adjudication can fail several ways. It fails in the tribal court in Randy Red
Wolfbecause the jurors' priors about liability are one or nearly so and re-
silient against whatever evidence the railroad might present. 60 Wall has
the converse trouble. Lacking antecedent experience with DID, the jurors
start with soft (unresilient) priors pointing every which way. Neither have
they any basis by which to assess the evidence. I know of no other context
in which a juror must decide not only the truth of what a witness says but
even whether the witness (Tootie Kay) exists. Here Daubert enters, or
should enter-although again a court, unlike an academic, must decide a
case, one way or the other.
VI. ERROR IN EXTREMIS
a. Recall that my friend Kraut worried that his wife loved him for his
properties, wanting her to love him as a bare particular.26' Through schol-
arly intensity and professional commitment, overcoming the distractions of
what Einstein called the merely personal, Kraut wrote free of his perhaps
clinical depression?62 He recorded his achievement in an introspective
autobiographical postscript to his essay "Love De Re."263 This record an-
ticipates (in a discipline more nearly mathematical) the narratives that em-
bellish contemporary legal studies of race and gender.264
The instrument of the'recovery of Kraut was philosophical (not phar-
macological, as one would expect). It came to him out of his analysis that
love is not grounded in judgment.26 But let Kraut speak for himself- "I
discovered an article by the psychologist Robert Zajonc,266 who claims to
have provided evidence for the 'primacy of affect'-for the view, that is,
that certain 'gut' reactions, though intentionally directed, may precede the
formation of belief."267 I recapitulate the liberating research of Zajonc.
Show a subject a sequence of unfamiliar pictures-polygons or Chi-
nese characters. Allow her ample time to study each before replacing it
note 143.
260. See Burlington N. R.R. Co., 106 F.3d at 868.
261. Seesuprap. 110-11 and note 142.
262. See Robert Kraut, Love De Re, 10 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 413 (1986); See also
Robert Kraut, Feelings in Context, 83 J. PHIL. 642 (1986).
263. See Kraut, Love De Re, supra note 262.
264. See, e.g., PATRIcrA J. WILLtAms, THEALCHEMYOFRACEAND RIGHTS (1991).
265. See Kraut, Love De Re, supra note 262, at 429.
266. See R.B. Zajone, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCH. 151 (1980).
267. Kraut, Love De Re, supra note 262, at 429.
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with another. Subsequently show the pictures one at a time again, now
mingled with others, themselves unfamiliar. Regarding each picture, ask
the subject two questions: "Have you seen this polygon (character) be-
fore?" and "Do you like it?" With few shapes and extended time com-
mitted to introductory display, the subject consistently answers the first
question correctly. She does not know what to make of the second ques-
tion, which looks like a category mistake, for how can you like a polygon?
Gradually increase the number of shapes you initially display, and reduce
the time the subject may consider them. Her answers to the first question
become less accurate. Eventually they are random, so that whether she has
seen a shape before has no bearing on whether she says that she has.
Throughout, the subject is responding to the second question, saying that
she likes or dislikes the shape or character. Oddly, "Do you like it?" be-
comes a more accurate surrogate for "Do you recognize it?" That is the
subject responds that she likes the shapes she has seen before, that she dis-
likes the interpolated shapes. She just does not know that she has seen
them before.
Zajonc interprets:
We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational manner
and weigh all the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But this is
probably seldom the actual case. Quite often 'I decided in favor of X' is
no more that 'I liked X.' Most of the time, information collected about
alternatives serves us less for making a decision than for justifying it
afterward.268
Zajone proposes an affective response (liking) that is independent of
the expected cognitive response (recognition). He asserts that "some dis-
crimination, however primitive or minimal, must have taken place" to
ground the affective response.269 That is true anyway. "There is a strong
path from stimulus exposure to subjective affect that is independent of rec-
ognition," he concludes, proposing the locus coeruleus as the place in the
brain establishing preferences.270 New and familiar stimuli excite it dispar-
ately; it is sensitive to incentives; it responds fast. "Affect was there before
we evolved language and our present form of thinking," he contends.
27
'
Said differently, down at the bottom of our brain, as the limbic system, we
retain its reptilian predecessor, overwritten but not disconnected. We use
268. Zajonc, supra note 266, at 175.
269. Id. at 163.
270. Id. at 162.
271. Id. at 169.
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it, circumventing consciousness, for fast (quick and dirty) responses.272
b. Blind sight is similar. A person whose brain is damaged, yet
whose optic nerves are intact, may unconsciously acquire visual informa-
tion. To test this acquisition, display a pattern: a large X or 0; a red or
green light (likely the subject can distinguish only gross differences). You
ask the subject whether there is an X or an 0 in what would be her visual
field, whether the light is red or green. The. subject replies impatiently: "I
am blind; I see nothing." Then you ask the subject to guess. With "im-
pressive accuracy," the subject guesses correctly"7  Likewise, she can
point to the part of her visual field (if she had one) at which a light is shin-
ing.274
I append a caveat more necessary in a less theoretical paper. A prac-
titioner (as contrasted with an academic) must in the current state of our
understanding only timidly appeal to the limbic system: invoke blind sight,
or affective rather than cognitive insight.. Patterns of testimony or. investi-
gation arguably premature include:
Attorney: Was the light red or green?
Witness: I don't know.
Attorney: Guess.
Assistant District Attorney (indicating lineup): Do you recognize any of
these persons as the perpetrator?
Victim: No.
Assistant District Attorney.: Do you like any of them?
Kraut and Rebecca remain happily married, despite having children.
c. Better than law landside, the maritime doctrine of error in extremis
takes into account the responses of the limbic system. Error in extremis is
the converse of last clear chance. I illustrate by a Second Circuit opinion
written by Learned Hand? 57
The Voca (a tanker, 394') and the Gypsum Prince (a freighter, 347')
collided off Delaware Bay on March 2, 1942.276 They were traversing a
channel 1.5 miles wide between minefields, the Gypsum Prince outward
272. See ROSALTND W. PiCARD, Aiacnv COMPUTING 5-45 (1997).
273. PATRICiA S. CHupcHLAND, Nsu.opnmOsopHY 226 (1986).
274. Id.
275. Socony Vacuum Transp. Co. v. Gypsum Packet Co., 153 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1946).
276. Id. at 774.
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bound.277 It being still dark (the ships collided at 6:46 AM), both ships car-
ried the statutory running lights 78 Being to starboard, the Voca had right
of way.279 The Gypsum Prince would cross her bow.280 The Voca altered
course eight degrees soon after the ships were visible to each other.2 ' In
the dark at a distance of several miles, the Gypsum Prince could not have
made out the change. 2s As ships converged, the Gypsum Prince sounded a
double blast to signal that she would cross.283 Responding correctly to the
signal, the Voca slowed and put her rudder hard left 84 The Gypsum
Prince precipitously put her rudder hard right, turning to starboard across
the bows of the Voca, which, "in extremis," as Hand finds, immediately
put her rudder hard right and went full speed astern.2" The Voca struck the
port side of the Gypsum Prince at an angle of seventy degrees, eighty feet
from her bow.28 6 The Gypsum Prince sank in 1000' of water within ten
minutes.8 7
By an act like Indiana (nearly) legislating an incorrect value of Pi,288
Icelandic law announces, "It is prescribed that there shall be no such things
as accidents."2 9 Practice mitigates the prescription)l Two admiralty
doctrines lie nearby. A court may declare inscrutable cause where some
ship erred but the court cannot tell which. Second, here contradicting Ice-
landic law, a court sitting in admiralty may declare inevitable accident: the
thing just happened and was the fault of no ship.
The district court exonerated the Voca, holding the Gypsum Prince at
fault, citing her for not keeping a proper watch, for not keeping out of the
Voca's way, for sounding a wrong signal, and for changing her course.2 91
So neither inscrutable cause nor inevitable accident applies here. Yet ad-
miralty law is not so simple.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 775.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id
282. Id
283. Id
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id
287. Id.
288. See Psm BECKMAN, HISTORY OF 1 174-77 (5th ed. 1982); LET's Go: THE
BUDGET GuIn TO USA 1996 at 419 (Michelle C. Sullivan ed., 1996). I thank my student
Stacy Volante for this reference.
289. WILLiAM IAN MiLLER BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING 62(1990).
290. See Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d I (1st Cir.
1990).
291. 153 F.2dat775.
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Hand affirms. 92 A problem is the change of course of eight degrees
by the Voca, imperceptible to the Gypsum Prince.293 It is a statutory viola-
tion: a ship having the right of way, as the Voca did must maintain her
course." 4 In admiralty, a statutory violation does not create just a pre-
sumption of fault. By the Pennsylvania rule,295 a ship committing a statu-
tory violation must show not only that the violation did not cause the colli-
sion, but that it could not have done so. The apparent modality ('could
not') seems in the cases to collapse into only high probability. Still the rule
is Draconian. Hand agrees with the district court that the initial change of
course by the Voca could not have caused the collision; and that her subse-
quent slowing and change of course, responding to the signal of the Gyp-
sum Prince, was not a statutory violation?96 The Gypsum Prince in effect
requested the Voca's response.
The actions that engage the response of admiralty to limbic system are
the final hard right rudder and backing by the Voca. Hand decides that
these were the Voca's correct actions in the exigency; that anyway they
occurred too late to contribute to the collision; and, significantly, that had
they been error, they are excusable as in extremis.
Hence Hand invokes error irr extremis contingently?97 The doctrine
relieves a ship of liability for acts taken without deliberation in contexts of
imminent peril39 Admiralty recognizes that navigation often needs rapid
response, by its nature inexact, sometimes mistaken. The distinction here
is that which separates reflective cortical behavior from reflexive, reptilian,
limbic response. At error in extremis, equity and efficiency seem to coin-
cide. A ship thus erring, although mistaken, is not at fault-morally ought
not be liable?99 A limbic response is unlearned and unlearnable, a result of
natural selection and genetic composition. Thus punishing it does not deter
it (except by selecting against it over thousands or millions of years).
The Gypsum Prince erred grievously. A common lawyer asks, why
did Hand so scrupulously exonerate the Voca? In admiralty, before Reli-
able Transfer,1°° parties to a loss divided it equally unless one was (or both
were) wholly faultless-as at common law slight contributory negligence
292. Id. at 778.
293. Id. at 776.
294. Id.
295. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
296. 153 F.2d at 776.
297. Id.
298. Postal S.S. Corp. v. The El Iselo, 308 U.S. 378 (1940).
299. See 153 F.2d at 777.
300. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
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completely barred recovery. Error in extremis avoids the rule of equal di-
vision (as last clear chance avoids contributory negligence), at the occa-
sional cost of entirely relieving from liability the vessel that successfully
invokes it. The doctrine has disappeared from the cases with the reason for
it. No case has considered in extremis since the date of Reliable Transfer,
1968. One opinion mentions it, comparing it with another bad rule.
301
Hand ends:
It would have been indeed an unfortunate outcome to charge the 'Voco'
with half damages; at most her proportion of the loss ought to have been
very small indeed. It is hard to see why we continue to insist upon an
equal division which almost all the civilized world has repudiated, and
for which it had substituted proportionate fault. Nevertheless, although
in the case at bar, we have not been called upon to apply that doctrine,
which has nothing to commend it and everything against it, it must not
be supposed that we should have hesitated to do so, had the facts war-
ranted.302
Error in extremis by that name does not appear in state cases. The ab-
sence is expected, the doctrine being from admiralty, state courts often ei-
ther not applying or misapplying this law. The exception is Virginia,
which has its own rule of in extremis, applied landside, or held as Hand
held it in reserve, when, for instance, a driver "unwisely" runs down a
telephone pole.03
VII. ANTIGONE
a. Antigone is about law, of course among other things. I will look at
just one legal aspect of Sophocles' drama. Recall the myth. 4 CEdipus and
Jocasta have two sons and two daughters (also his brothers and sisters, her
grandchildren). 3 5 The sons, Eteocles and Polynices, kill each other outside
Thebes, Eteocles defending, Polynices attacking the city.3" Creon rules
Thebes.0 7 He decrees that Polynices lie unburied as an enemy of and trai-
tor to the city.30 ' Exposing a corpse is sacrilegious 0 9 Antigone (although
not her sister Ismene) symbolically buries Polynices by throwing dirt on his
301. Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Division) v. S.S. Ponce de Leon, 409 F. Supp. 909,915 (2d
Cir. 1976).
302. 153 F.2d at 777-78.
303, Wyatt v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 163 S.E. 370, 372 (Va. 1932).
304. See supra p. 9.
305. OLD SHEPARD, supra note 97.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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corpse, thus flaunting Creon's decree31 Tiresias shows up here too.3 1
Despite his warning that this is a poor idea, Creon orders that Antigone be
locked in a tomb to die?"2 Antigone hangs herself there? 3 Haemon the
son of Creon loves Antigone and kills himself with his sword beside her?' 4
Eurydice the wife of Creon hangs herself.315 Things have not worked out
well for Creon (or for that matter for anybody else). The chorus conclude
the drama, "The mighty words of the proud are paid in full / with mighty
blows of fate, and at long last/ those blows will teach us wisdom." 31 6
So we have Antigone acting very nobly?' 7 Now go back to the scene
in which she in her final speech purports to tell Creon why she has buried
Polynices:
Never, I tell you, if I had been the mother of children, or if my husband
died, exposed and rotting-I'd never have taken this ordeal upon myself,
never defied our people's will. What law, you ask, do I satisfy with
what I say? A husband dead, there might have been another. A child by
another too, if I had lost the first. But mother and father both lost in the
halls of Death, no brother could ever spring to light again.31
She is not expressing noble sentiments here.
So philologically there is a problem. Philologists sometimes resolve it
by cutting the Gordian knot, repudiating the lines as interpolated. For ex-
ample, Jebb says, "after long thought, I cannot bring myself to believe that
Soph[ocles] ... wrote" them,319 adding that some of the lines, 909-12, are
especially "unworthy of Soph[ocles." 320 The textual evidence against
authenticity is unpersuasive, however: hardly more than that the lines are
undistinguished and that they avoid the expected civsp for 'husband'? 2'
Also, Aristotle cited the lines without alluding to any inauthenticity in 338
BC, hence within a century of Sophocles' death (although the Antigone is
early Sophocles).
If the passage is authentic, why did Sophocles write it? It is a safe
generalization that most philologists are male and few are attorneys. Start
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. id.
315. Id.
316. SOPHOCLES. THEANTIGONE. 1351-53 (Richard C. Jebb ed., 1902).
317. See GEORGE STEINER, ANTIGONIES (Yale ed. 1996).
318. Id. at 1l. 905-12.
319. SoPiiocLes, supra note 316, at 182.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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from universal agreement that the argument Antigone makes is invalid.
Take the male philologists first. They believe that logical argument is the
(male) norm, but graciously excuse a "girl" from logicality: "Antigone is
neither a philosopher nor a devot6, but a passionate, impulsive girl, and we
should not expect consistency from one such." " Antigone was between
twelve and fifteen-old enough to be betrothed but too young to marry.
Marriage occurred promptly upon menarche, we are told 23 That said, the
complaint is that to depict a woman realistically in this respect contravenes
the elevated conventions of classical drama: "In real life, no doubt, a girl
facing death might talk illogically; but this is a speech in a Greek trag-
edy .... , 324
A female commentator calls the argument sophistic, crass, illogical,
inappropriate, and male.
Soph[ocles] gives her this bit of contemporary sophistry, a crass "mas-
culine" exercise in mental gymnastics. But An[tigone] is no sophist.
Here she is pure woman, trying to justify herself to herself. Because her
reason is not logical but instinctive, her analysis can only produce a
formal "masculine" tone and an illogical, inappropriate syllogism.
325
Recall Kraut and the limbic system.
3 26
b. A little law on the side. Philologists also criticize the lines as in-
scrutably morally obtuse because legalistic. For example, Sophoclean
drama has a "forensic element... when the character assumes the
quasi-legal mode, so that we must conceive of Antigone retreating from the
engagement of her living plight in order to offer an alternative formal de-
fence of her conduct, as if she were pleading in a court of law."
3 27
So we turn to the legal literature. That will set the record straight, we
anticipate. It doesn't. At least I think it doesn't-I can't understand it:
Similarly, if the ethical substance is the union of opposites, of man and
woman, of consciousness and unconsciousness, of universal and singu-
lar, of state and divine law, Antigone shows that the pleasure of the
copulation and concep(tion) never fully arrives and that, contra Hegel,
the law of reason and man will be judged in the (nocturnal) light of de-
sire and woman.3 21
322. H.D.F. KiTro, FORM AND MEANwNGIN DRAMA 170-71 (1954).
323. See Andrew Wilson, The Classics Pages: Odysseus' Page (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http:/lwww.users.globalnet.co.ukt-loxias/antigone02.htm>.
324. ANDREw BROWN, SOPHOCLES: AmIGONE200 (1987).
325. JOAN V. O'BREN, GUIDEO SOPHOCLEs' ANTIGONE 104 (1978).
326. See supra p. 124.
327. JOHN JONES, ON ARISTOTLE AND GREEKZ TRAGEDY 197 (1962).
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c. Herodotus has a precedent that is at once the source of the passage
and not in point. Darius, the Persian king, has ordered his servants to admit
Intaphranes unannounced unless Darius is with a wife. 29 Darius being thus
engaged, his servants deny access to the king. Piqued, Intaphranes cuts off
the noses and ears of the servants, stringing these around their necks.330
The servants complain of this treatment to Darius, who confines and in-
tends to kill Intaphranes and his (male) relatives.333
Then Intaphranes' wife came ever and anon to the palace gates, weeping
and lamenting; and at last her continual so doing moved Darius to com-
passion; and he sent a messenger to tell her that Darius would grant her
the life of one of her imprisoned kinfolk, whomever she chose. She, af-
ter counsel taken, answered that if this were the king's boon she chose
the life of her brother. Darius was astonished when he heard her answer,
and sent one who said to her: "Woman, the king would know for what
reason you pass over your husband and your children and choose rather
to save the life of your brother, who is less close to you than your chil-
dren and less dear than your husband." "0 King," she answered, "an-
other husband I may get, if heaven so will, and other children, if I lose
these; but my father and mother are dead, so I can by no means get an-
other brother; that is why I have thus spoken." Darius was pleased, and
thought the reason good; he delivered to the woman him for whose life
she had asked, and the eldest of her sons besides; all the rest he put to
death.332
Inaphranes' wife acts to save her brother because she cannot have an-
other, while Polynices is dead and the issue Antigone resolves is whether to
bury him.333 Hence that Antigone cannot have another brother should be
irrelevant.
d. Here identity helps out, in the form of Jones explaining the con-
tested lines.334 "Num Deus potuerit suppositare mulierem? Num Diabo-
lum? Num asinum? Num cucurbitam?" Erasmus writes, that is, "Could
not God have assumed the (earthly) form of a woman, the devil, a donkey,
or a pumpkin?" 33- So imagine a pumpkin: "[How could a pumpkin have
Death: On Ontological and Psychoanalytical Ethics, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1325, 1356
(1995).
329. 2 HERODOTUS, THE Hisro~iEs, bk. 3, §119 (A.D. Godley trans., 1938).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See JONES, supra note 327, at 197-200.
335. 3 JACOB BRUCKER, HIsTOaA CarrcA PnLOSOPHiAE 878 (1756).
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preached, or been crucified?" 336
Erasmus (and Hegel) are writing counterfactually. A counterfactual is
a sentence that has the form, 'If A were true, then B would be true.' Note
the subjunctives: the form presupposes that the antecedent of the condi-
tional is false. One determines the truth of a counterfactual by inspecting
the possible worlds in which the antecedent is true. If the consequent is
true in all of these worlds, the counterfactual is true. Jones observes that
Antigone speaks counterfactually: "Never, I tell you, if I had been the
mother of children, or if my husband died, exposed and rotting-I'd never
have taken this ordeal upon myself, never defied our people's will."
337
Antigone would bury her husband or children nowhere-in no possible
world.
The law uses counterfactuals all the time. Cause is often interpreted
counterfactually: "But for such and such, so and so." Rose in Sherwood v.
Walker was not the cow the parties tried to contract about because Rose is
pregnant in no possible world 3 Expectation damages are what would
have happened less what did.
Use of counterfactuals requires some sophistication. Especially, a
counterfactual about the speaker requires that she identify herself in possi-
ble worlds other than the actual world. A prerequisite to her doing so,
therefore to her successful use of the linguistic form, is that she be robustly
self-aware-she must have a concept of herself strong enough that she can
locate herself in these other worlds. Jones argues that the Greeks, includ-
ing Sophocles, lacked a solid concept of themselves.339 Hence Antigone,
unable to imagine herself as married or a mother, speaks ungroundedly, as
would any Greek. "In short," Jones says, Antigone "knows no adequate
modem 'you' which would give an adequate modern sense to the question:
'What would you do if it were a husband or child lying unburied? ' 34I
One version of a legal person is someone able to make this identifica-
tion. Contracting presupposes insight about consequences (here to oneself)
across temporal worlds. So does sanity, if one takes a consequentialist
view of right and wrong, or imagines that having free will assumes an abil-
ity to do otherwise.
336. 3 GEORO W. F. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILosOPHY: THE
LEcTUREs OF 1825-1826 at 67 (Robert F. Brown ed., 1990).
337. See JONES, supra note 327, at 197-200.
338. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
339. See JONES, supra note 327, at 197-200.
340. JONES, supra note 327, at 197.
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CONCLUSION
What have I provided beyond entertainment? Evidently, persons and
personal identity are not data to law-not exogenous variables, but deter-
mined within it. Neither the idea that something that looks presupposed is
endogenous nor the idea that law makes up things is new. Outside law,
gender is socially constructed, feminists tell us."' And perhaps quarks are
too?42 And within law, consciousness of legal fictions has been with us
from Fuller, 43 who did not invent them. I have connected the insights-no
great thing. Yet the unanticipated richness of the result delights me.
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